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To INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE:
THE RIGHT OF NON-SETTLING PRPs TO
INTERVENE IN CERCLA LITIGATION
UNITED STATES V. UNION ELECTRIC Co. 1
by Erick Roeder
1. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Missouri Electric Works Site
(MEW Site) in Cape Girardeau, Mis-
souri was occupied by an electrical
equipment and repair shop for nearly
forty years.2 The shop's business during
this period included salvaging, repair-
ing, and selling transformers and other
electronic equipment.3 Beginning in the
1950s, coolant oil, containing poly
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), was used
in transformers to reduce the risk of fires
and explosions.' Although PCBs were
an effective coolant, they presented a
threat to the environment because of
their toxicicity and persistence.s Prior to
the late 1970s, when PCB regulation
began, coolant leaks and spills contain-
ing PCBs were common at the MEW
Site.6
In the early 1980s, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) discovered PCB
contamination at the MEW Site.' In ac-
cordance with the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA),8 the EPA
identified approximately 735 potentially
responsible parties (PRPs).' These par-
ties consisted of companies that had
sold or sent used transformers to MEW
to be junked or repaired.'o Many of
these companies joined a "PRP group,"
which participated in negotiations with
the EPA." These negotiations, which
took place over approximately two
years, addressed the allocation of
cleanup costs at the MEW Site.12
The EPA presented all known PRPs
with a proposed consent decree in Sep-
tember 1991. In order for a PRP to be
included in the proposed settlement a
response was required within sixty
days.'3 In June 1992, the EPA filed suit
based on CERCIA §§ 106 and 107'4
against 179 PRPs who signed the pro-
posed consent decree and agreed to
settle.15 The settlement decree required
the settling PRPs to contribute various
amounts to the clean-up costs based on
an allocation formula arrived at during
the negotiations between the "PRP
group" and the EPA.' 6 According to the
Consent Decree, the settling PRPs would
receive protection from contribution ac-
tions or claims, as provided by §
11 3(f)(2) of CERCLA. 17
In November 1992, a group of
twelve non-settling PRPs" moved to inter-
vene in this suit. They claimed that
they had a protectable interest in pre-
serving potential contribution claims
United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152 18th Cir. 19951.





a 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).





1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606,9607 (1988).
"s United Stlates v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1155-56.
18 Id.atIll56.
17 Id. The statute reads, "a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in on administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its
terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the setlement.- 42 U.S.C. § 9613[112) (1988).
1o United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1155. "The non-seilling PRPs are service shop owners who either sold electrical transformers direcily to MEW for
resale, sold transformers to third parties who resold them to MEW, or sent transformers owned by others to MEW for repair. However, the non-seilling PRPs did not
send any transformers to MEW to be scrapped or otherwise disposed of. .. .t[hey] assert that the allocation formula arrived at in these negotiations 'grossly
overstated' their potential liability, because it did not allocale response costs in a way that reflected the comparative responsibililies of the various PRPs and did not
correlate costs of remedial action with contaminants contributed by the parties." Id.
19 Id.at 1156.
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against the settling PRPs and on interest
in fair apportionment of liability for the
"MEW clean-up.",20 They also asserted
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)21 and Section
11 3(i) of CERCLA 22 gave them a legal
right to intervene. 3 The district court
rejected these claims and denied the
non-settling PRPs' motion to intervene.2
The non-settling PRPs then brought an
appeal before the United Slates Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit. 5 This court re-
versed the district court's holding.26 It
held that when there is a suit by the EPA
against PRPs who agree to settle, and
the settling parties would thereby be pro-
tected from claims of PRPs who do not
wish to settle, the non-settling PRPs have
a legally protectable interest in a right to
contribution under CERCLA section
1 1 3(f)( 1).2' Thus, the non-settling PRPs
are given a right to intervene pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24" and CERCLA §
113(i)."
11. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issue presented in United States
v. Union Electric Co. is whether non-
settling PRPs have a legal right to
intervene in an action by the EPA
against settling PRPs based on the non-
settling PRPs' interest in preserving possi-
ble contribution claims and preventing
unfairly apportioned liability.o The
Eighth Circuit decided this issue as one
of first impression. Decisions from
other jurisdictions result in a split of
authority on the issue.32  Although no
consensus has been reached, these deci-
sions do provide insight as to how a
court faced with this issue should
proceed.
A. Rules and Statutes
The Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)33 was
enacted to provide a plan of action for
when hazardous substances escape into
the environment,34 and to provide for the
cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
sites.3 Congress based CERCLA on the
policy that taxpayers should not have to
pay to protect the public from dangers
created by those who profit from busi-
nesses that deal with hazardous sub-
stances. Instead, Congress chose to
place this burden on those potentially
responsible for the pollution through a
system of retroactive strict liability.37 Un-
der this system, the EPA may require
PRPs to investigate and/or remediate
hazardous waste sites, or alternatively,
may require PRPs to reimburse the EPA
for taking such action." Congress's
two purposes in enacting CERCIA were:
(1) to promote prompt investiga-
tion and remediation of facilities
or sites at which the release or
threatened release of hazardous
substances presents a risk to
human health and the environ-
ment; and (2) to shift the costs
20 Id.
2 Id The Rule states that "lu]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted 10 intervene in an aclion: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an
unconditionol right 1o intervene; or (21 when the applicant claims on interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant
is -co situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest
is adequately represented by existing parties." FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
22 See intro note 50 and accompanying text.
23 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1156-57.
24 Id. at I 156 The district court gave two reasons for denying the motion. First, it stated that a "significantly proteciable interest" is not created by a claim for
rervention under CERCIA § I I 311fl[ 1). Therefore, intervention was not warranted. Second, the district court reasoned that the interest in contribution claims was
"too 'peculative and contingent" to support intervention. According to the court, this was because interest in contribution would arise only if future litigation was
commenced against she non-seilling PRPs and such litigation might or might not result in liability being placed on these PRPs. Id.
2 Id
26 Id at 117071.
2 fd at I 16667. The statute reads "[ainy person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this litle,
during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable
parlies using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(F][1) (19881.
21 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
2 Id.
3 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1156.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1163-64 (citing United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. 603, 60708 (W.D. Mich. 19931; United States v. Wheeling Disposal Serv., Inc., No.
92M132CV-W-1, 1992 WI 685724 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 1, 1992); Uniled Slates v. Vasi, 22 Chem. Waste Lil. Rep. 218, 219 IN.D. Ohio 1991); United States v.
Beazer East Inc., 22 Chem. Waste Lil. Rep. 218, 222-23 (N.D. Ohio 19911; United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 57677 (W.D. Wis.
19901; United Slotes v. Acton Corp., 131 F.R.D. 431 (D. NJ. 19901).
" 2 U.S.C §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
'4 lynette Boomgaarden and Charles Breer, Surveying The Superfund Settlement Dilemma, 27 L(Ao& WAiR L. REv. 83, 84 (19921.
3 Id. at 84.
3 Id. (citing CONGFEss!oNw RESEARCH SEcICE, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., EmmmEomw ANo NATURA REsOURCEs Policy DrvistoN, A LEGIstATIvE HIsTORY OF TH COREHENSIVE
Euotvr.ENTAL RPspoNsE, Co:AFENsATONAN" ['lY ACT OF 1980, 405 (Comm. Print 1983).
27 Jerome M Organ, Svperfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1043,
I04&48 (1994).
28 Id. at 10505 1.
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of investigating and remediating
such sites, whenever possible,
to the PRPs." 9
In its first attempts at implementing CER-
CIA, the EPA was unable to accomplish
either of these goals.40
In response, Congress passed the
Superfund Amendment and Reauthoriza-
tion Act (SARA) in 1986 to ensure the
quick and effective cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites.4 ' The 1986 Act added
several new sections to CERCIA. 42
These new sections create the following
step by step process which is used in the
settlement of CERCLA actions.
The EPA begins formal negotiations
by identifying PRPs and sending them
special notice letters.43 The PRPs then
have sixty days to organize themselves
and set forth a good faith proposal
which shows they are qualified and will-
ing to conduct and pay for a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study.44  If a
"substantial portion" of the PRPs and the
EPA come to an agreement, the agree-
ment is entered in the appropriate
United States district court as a pro-
posed consent decree.4 s The EPA must
give public notice of the proposed con-
sent decree by publishing it in the Fed-
eral Register.46 Following publication,
there is a thirty day period for public
comment.4 7 If there are comments indi-
cating that the proposed agreement is
"inappropriate, improper, or inade-
quate," the EPA or the Attorney General
may withhold or withdraw consent to the
agreement." If the Attorney General
and the EPA do not choose to withhold
or withdraw consent, the district court in
which the proposed consent decree is
filed may begin proceedings to finalize
the settlement.
Once such litigation begins, SARA
gives interested parties the right to inter-
vene.4 " Section 1 1 3(i) provides:
In any action commenced under
this chapter or under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act in a Court
of the United States, any person
may intervene as a matter of
right when such person claims
an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action
may, as a practical matter, im-
pair or impede the person's
ability to protect that interest,
unless the President or the State
shows that the person's interest
is adequately represented by
existing paries.50
This language is nearly identicals' to
the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(0),s2 so courts use virtually
the same test in deciding whether to al-
low intervention under section 11 3(i) as
they do when applying Rule 24 (a)."
This test has four requirements: 1) the
application for intervention must be
timely; 2) the applicant must have a rec-
ognized interest in the subject matter of
the litigation; 3) that interest must be at
risk of being impaired by disposition of
the litigation; and 4) the interest is not
adequately protected by existing
parties.S
Even though the purposes of Rule 24
and section 113(i) of CERCIA are so
similar, non-settling parties usually at-
tempt to intervene under both. The rea-
son for intervening under both is to
overcome the possible argument that
Congress did not intend section 113(i)
to be a means for non-settling PRPs to
challenge consent decrees.ss Section
159(h) of CERCLAs' states that CERCLA
will not impair any person's rights under
federal law.57 Therefore, if a court finds
that non-settler intervention is not avail-
able under section II 3(i), intervention is
still possible under Rule 24(a)."
Although it is clear that, in some
39 Id.oa 1051-52.
Id. at 1052.
4 United Stares v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1 174, 1179-80 (3rd Cir. 1994) Iciing H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99h Cong., 2nd Sess. 55 119861 reprinted in1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837).
42 United States v. Alcon, 25 F.3d at 1180.
a Boomgoarden and Breer, supro note 34, at 89.
" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e12](A) 119881).
4 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)[Al (1988).
4 Boomgoorden and Breer, supro note 34, at 89 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(i)(1) (988)).
o Boomgoarden and Breer, supro note 34, 01 89.
a Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(dli2)[B), (i][3) (1988)).
* United States v. Alcon, 25 F.3d af 1180.
* 42 U.S.C. § 96131i) (1988).
st The only distinction between ihe two provisions is ihat under Rule 24all2), the prospective intervenors have the burden of proving that their interests are notadequately protected by the existing ponies, while under section I131i), the burden of proof is placed on the government. United States v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. at433.
S2 See supra note 21.
m United States v. Alcan, 25 F.3d at 1181 Iciling Utah v. Kennecoll Corp., 801 F.Supp. 553, 571-572 (D. Utah 1992); Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 139 F.R.D.141, 144 (D. Ariz. 1991); United States v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433).
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesola, 989 F.2d 994, 997 (8th Or. 19931 (citing Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens forCommunity Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869181h Cir. 19771).
- Boomgaarden and Breer, supro note 34, at 112 n.196.
36 42 U.S.C. § 9659h)(1988).
I Boomgaarden and Breer, supro nole 34, at 112 n.196.58 Id.
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circumstances, parties may intervene in
a CERCIA actions, it is not yet deter-
mined whether a party's interest in con-
tribution claims is enough to warrant
intervention in a CERCIA proceeding.s"
However, courts do seem to agree that
the four part test,W derived from Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), is the start-
ing point for analysis of this issue.
B. Case Law
In determining whether to allow inter-
vention, courts first determine whether
the intervention motion is timely.6' In
Mile Lacs Bond of Chippewa Indians,62
a non-CERCIA intervention case, the fac-
tors for determining timeliness in the
Eighth Circuit were set out as follows:
the reason for delay in seeking interven-
tion; how for the litigation had pro-
gressed before attempted intervention;
and how much prejudice other parties
would suffer if intervention is allowed. 3
Courts hearing CERCIA actions in
other jurisdictions have used different
factors in determining timeliness. In Mid-
State Disposal," the court looked to:
the length of time the party knew or
should have known of the interest in liti-
gation before attempting to intervene;
prejudice to litigating parties due to de-
lay caused by intervention; prejudice to
9 See supra note text accompanying note 49.
6 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62 See supro note 54 and accompanying text.
63 Mille locs, 989 F.2d of 998.
6 United States v. Mid-State, 131 F.R.D. at 573.
61 Id. at 576 (citing Bloomington Ind. v. Westingho








n3 42 U.S.C. § 9622(dl21[A) (1988).
76 Browning-Ferris, No. 89-568-A, 1989 U.S. Dist.
7 Boomgoorden and Breer, supra note 34, of 114.
n See supro note 54 and accompanying text.
n9 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1 15
S0 United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. of 603.
8' Id. ot 607-08.
s2 Id.
the party attempting to intervene if inter-
vention is denied; and any unusual cir-
cumstances in the case.6 5 In Mid-State,
the non-settling PRPs withdrew from settle-
ment negotiations in May 19 89 .6 The
other parties settled, and the EPA filed a
complaint against the settlers and a pro-
posed consent decree in November
1989.6' The non-settling PRPs did not
attempt to intervene until March 1990,
when the court heard the motion for en-
try of the consent decree.68  The court
found the delay excessive, holding that
the original parties would suffer preju-
dice because allowing intervention
would render the original negotiations
useless.69 The court also found that the
intervenors would not suffer prejudice
because they could have voiced objec-
tions to the consent decree during the
period for public comment.70
In United States v. Browning-Ferris
Industries Chemical Services, Inc.,7' the
court considered the same factors as
Mid-State to determine timeliness.72
However, in Browning-Ferris, the court
allowed intervention." In this case, no-
tice of the proposed consent decree was
published on August 7, 1989, and ap-
plication for intervention was filed on
September 8, 1989.' The government
argued that intervention should not be
use Elec. Corp., 824 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1987)).
(citing United States v. Mid-State, 131 F.R.D. at 576).
.D. ta. Nov. 15, 1989).
LEXIS 16596 (M.D. La. Nov. 15, 1989).
7.
allowed because of section 122(d)(2)(A)
of CERCLA,75 requiring that application
be filed within thirty days. In allowing
intervention, however, the court rea-
soned that the statutory period was not
absolute.76
The general rule that can be ex-
tracted from Mid-State and Browning-
Ferris is that courts will consider an op-
plicant's attempt at intervention timely as
long as there is a showing of reason-
able diligence on the part of the party
seeking intervention and as long as the
existing parties will not be prejudiced by
intervention. 7
Once a court decides whether a mo-
tion to intervene is timely, the next step is
to determine whether the party seeking
intervention has a legally protectable
interest in the litigation.78  Courts ad-
dressing the issue of whether an interest
in contribution claims is legally protect-
able have arrived at differing results. 9
In United States v. ABC Industries,s0 the
court found that an interest in contribu-
tion claims was not sufficiently protect-
able."i It reasoned that although the
interest did not appear to be "contingent
or speculative," it was subordinated by
CERCIA's policy of promoting early de
minimis settlements and final judgments
achieved through those settlements.
MELPR 151
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The importance of this policy has
been emphasized by many courts in-
volved in CERCLA litigation. United
States v. Cannons Engineering Corp.8
was not a case involving an intervention
issue, but its holding is relevant to the
analysis of CERCLA intervention actions.
In Cannons, a group of non-settling PRPs
argued that the immunity from contribu-
tion claims granted to the settling PRPs
by CERCIA Section 113 (f)(2) would
result in a disproportionate allocation of
response costs." The non-settling PRPs
argued that this was "unfair and incon-
sistent with the statutory plan."-s The
court rejected this argument, stating that
although the immunity from contribution
claims granted to settling PRPs by Sec-
tion 113 (f)(2) does create a risk of dis-
proportionate liability, it is not
forbidden.86 In fact, the court held that
such disproportionate liability was an
integral part of the statutory plan de-
signed to promote early settlements and
deter "litigation for litigation's sake."8
The court found that the risk of being
subject to disproportionate liability was
imposed on PRPs by Congress to encour-
age PRPs to take part in settlements."
The court's conclusions in Cannons seem
to suggest that the right to contribution
claims and fairly apportioned liability
are not legally protectable interests.
In United States v. Acton," the court
come to the opposite conclusion and
held that an interest in contribution
claims was sufficiently protectable to
warrant intervention.9 The court
granted the non-settling PRPs' right to
contribution pursuant to Section
113(f)(f1) of CERCLA.' The court
found that the right asserted by the non-
settling PRPs was not merely economic,
but a statutory right that might later be
"extinguished."9 Since this right to con-
tribution was the only means by which
the non-setilers could be made whole, if
liability was imposed on them beyond
their "fair share," the court held that a
"substantial legally protected interest"
existed."
Once a court has determined that an
application to intervene in a CERCLA
action is timely and the intervenor has a
sufficiently protectable interest, the court
next must determine whether that interest
is at risk of being impaired by disposi-
tion of the litigation and whether the in-
terest is adequately protected by existing
parties.9s Both of these steps come into
play only after the court has determined
that a protectable interest exists. There-
fore, Acton, being the only case to hold
that there is a legally protectable interest
in contribution claims in a CERCIA inter-
vention action,96 provides the logical
guideline for a court applying these
requirements.
After concluding that the non-settling
PRPs had a legally protectable interest,
Acton determined that allowing the liti-
gation to proceed without intervention
would impair the non-settling PRPs'
"ability to protect that interest."9 The
court reasoned that approval of a con-
sent decree would completely eliminate
the non-settling PRPs' contribution claims
against the settling PRPs."
Next, Acton addressed the question
of whether the non-settling PRPs' interest
was adequately represented by parties
already involved in the litigation." The
government argued that the non-settling
PRPs' interest was represented in the
consent decree proceedings because
the non-settling PRPs had submitted pub-
lic comments on the matter.'" The court
rejected this argument, stating that repre-
sentation must be provided "by existing
parties," and there was no party in the
litigation that represented the non-settling
PRPs.ioi
It is with the above legal back-
ground, consisting of the four part stalu-
tory test and case law with varied
results, that the court in United States v.
Union Electric Co.i 2 set out to resolve
the question of whether to recognize a
right of non-settling PRPs to intervene in
CERCIA cases, based on an interest in
contribution claims and prevention of
unfairly apportioned liability.
Ill. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the court
82 899 F.2d 79 (1 si Cir. 1990).
8 Id. as 92.
e Id.
*6 Id. a] 91.
7 Id. at 92.
s Id.
8' United States v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. a 431.
90 Id. at 434.
91 42 U.S.C. § 9613(ij[21(1988).
Q United Staies v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433.
" Id. at 434.
9 Id.
9 See supra text accompanying note 54.
* United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1164.




t02 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1152.
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began its analysis by comparing Section
11 3(i) of CERCLA' 03 with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24 (a)." Because of
the similarity in language between the
two provisions, the court found that the
some standards for intervention should
be used when analyzing CERCIA inter-
vention cases as are used in intervention
cases under Rule 24(a).ios In addition,
the court found that the district court
erred by basing its decision on policy
considerations instead of the standards
for intervention outlined in Rule 24(a).i"
The court then proceeded to apply Rule
24(a) standards to the facts of the pre-
sent case.107
In examining the first step in the Rule
24 analysis of determining whether the
motion to intervene is timely,ios the court
noted that the key consideration is
whether the delay in moving for interven-
tion will prejudice the existing parties.'oo
I1 then stated that in this case any preju-
dice against the existing parties was not
due to delay by the non-settling PRPs."o
The court reached this result because,
although the motion to intervene was not
filed until almost four months after the
lawsuit began, litigation was still in its
early stages when the motion to
intervene was filed."'
The court found that the timeliness re-
quirement protects against prejudice suf-
fered as a result of delay in filing for
intervention, not from prejudice suffered
as a result of an intervenor's presence in
a lawsuit. 2 Therefore, it held that de-
lay in entry of the Consent Decree was
not barred by the timeliness requirement
because this delay was not caused by
an untimely motion for intervention.' 13
After resolving that timeliness was not
a bar to intervention in this case, the
court turned to the question of whether
the non-settling PRPs had a recognized
interest in the subject matter of the litiga-
lion." Despite the fact that the majority
of jurisdictions that had previously ad-
dressed this question answered in the
negative, the court held that non-settling
PRPs did have a legally protectable inter-
est in contribution claims sufficient to
warrant intervention. 15 In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected the lower
court's analysis which was based on
policy considerations and legislative in-
tent.116 The court reasoned that, since
there was no ambiguity in the relevant
statutes, policy and legislative intent
should not be considered." 7
Therefore, the court based its arialy-
sis on applying statutory provisions to
the facts of the instant case." It first
examined CERCLA Section 113(f)(1)"'
and determined that the non-settling PRPs
were among those to whom the statute
granted a right of contribution.120 The
court next reasoned that, since this right
was asserted during the litigation and
arose from liability which would be a
result of the litigation, this right was di-
rectly related to the litigation. 2' Further-
more, the court noted that, because a
final settlement in this litigation would cut
off the non-settling PRPs' right to contribu-
tion under CERCLA Section 11 3(f)(2),' 22
the non-settling PRPs' interest in the sub-
ject matter of the litigation was "direct
and immediate." 23
After concluding that the non-settling
PRPs had a legally protectable interest,
the court addressed whether this interest
would be impaired by the litigation.124
It held that the interest in contribution
claims would be impaired because such
claims against the settling PRPs would be
barred or reduced in value under CER-
CIA Section 11 3(f)(2).' 25
Lastly, the court addressed whether
the existing parties adequately
represented the non-settling PRPs.126 The
court noted that generally potential inter-
venors must meet only a "minimal"
te2 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
104 United Stotes v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1157. See supra text accompanying note 21.
ins United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1158. The court noted one exception: Under § 113(i), the burden of showing [hot the prospective intervenors'
interest is adequotely represented by existing parties is p!oced on the President or the State, while under Rule 24[a) the prospective intervenor has the burden to show
that "no existing party adequately represents its interests." Id.
106 Id
toy Id.
'" See supro text accompanying note 54.




"' Id. at 1160-65.
'is Id. at11t64-65.
116 Id. at 1165.
" Id.
11 Id. Gt 1166.
"1 See supro note 50 and accompanying text.
I" United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1166.
121 Id
'22 See supro note 17.
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burden in showing inadequate represen-
toion by existing parties. 12 7 However,
"where the state is a party to a suit in-
volving a matter of sovereign interest, the
state is presumed to represent the inter-
ests of all of its citizens.""12 The court
noted that this presumption can be rebut-
ted by showing that the potential interve-
nor's interest is not the some as the
interest shared by all of the citizens of
the state.1 29 Furthermore, the court rea-
soned that the potential intervenors had
a narrow and "parochial" financial
interest, while the general interest of citi-
zens was in the cleanup of polluted
sites.i 30
The court rejected the EPA and set-
tling PRPs' contention that the non-settling
PRPs' interest was adequately repre-
sented because the non-settling PRPs had
an opportunity to voice their arguments
through negotiations and public com-
ment prior to the drafting of the consent
decree.'13  According to the court, this
argument was not on point because
"[t]he question is not whether the interve-
nors had any other way of protecting
their interests, but whether those interests
are protected in this litigation."i 32
The court further held that the non-
settling PRPs' interest was not repre-
sented by the parties involved in the liti-
gation.133 It reached this conclusion by
comparing the interests of the EPA and
the settling PRPs with those of the non-
settling PRPs." 3 The court found that
since the settling PRPs wished to termi-
nate the non-settling PRPs' contribution
claims, the interests of the two groups
conflicted.' Therefore, it would be im-
possible for the settling PRPs to represent
the interest of the non-settling PRPs in the
litigation.136
IV. COMMENT
A. Relation to Precedent
In United States v. Union Electric
Co., the court began its analysis by
looking to Section 113(i) of CERCIA 1 7
and Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' The court used the
four part analysis derived from these pro-
visions, which is used by virtually all
courts in deciding CERCLA intervention
cases.139 In its application of the sec-
ond step of the analysis, the court
reached a different result from that
reached by most courts presented with
similar facts. Generally, courts have
found that non-settling PRPs do not have
a protectable interest in preserving po-
tential contribution claims.140 This court,
however, followed the minority view and
held that non-settling PRPs do, in fact,
have such an interest. IA
In breaking from the majority view,
the court flatly rejected policy considera-
tions and legislative intent as relevant
concerns. 14 2  Instead, [he court pur-
ported to use the plain language of the
statutes involved. 4 s It stated that be-
cause the statutory provisions which pro-
vide for intervention are unambiguous,
allowing intervention would not be "a
result demonstrably at odds with the in-
tentions of the framers."144 The court
stated that allowing intervention under
Section 113(i) of CERCLA14S would not
preclude the effect of Section
I 3(f)(2). 46 It was because of this con-
clusion147 that the court decided not to
consider policy or legislative intent. 4 O
When a statute is unambiguous
the courts should simply enforce it ac-
cording to its plain language.149 How-
ever, in the instant case it is not clear
that the statutes are unambiguous. In
fact, the provisions of Section 11 3(i) are
in direct conflict with those of Section
113(f)(2) in the context of the present
126 Id.al 1168-70.
127 Id.at 1168.
128 id. (ciling Mille lacs, 989 F.2d at 1000).
12 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1169.
130 Id. (citing Mille Locs, 989 F.2d at 1001).
131 td.
1n id. Iciing Mille Iacs, 989 F.2d at 997-99).
I" United Staes v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d aI 170.
13 Id.aot 1169.
125 Id.at 1 170.
136 Id.
1" See supro note 50 and accompanying text.
138 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1156-57. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
1" See supro text accompanying note 54.
1o See United States v. Alcan, 25 F.3d at 1174; United Slates v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. at 607.08; United States v. Wheeling Disposal, No. 92-0132CV-W-1,
1992 WL 685724; United States v. Vasi, 22 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. at 219; United States v. Beozer East, 22 Chem. Waste tit. Rep. at 222-23; United States v.
MidSlate, 131 F.R.D. at 576-77.
142 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1164.
142 id.a 1165-66.
to3 id.alll1]65.
i Id. at 1 166 (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
in See supatextcaccompanying note 50.
t See-supro lexi accompanying note 125.
'4 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1165-66.
148 id.at 1166.
in See Melohn v. Pennock ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1502 (816 Cir. 1992).
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case. Allowing the non-settling PRPs to
intervene under 11 3(i) nullifies the incen-
tive to prompt settlement created by Sec-
tion 1 13(f)(2)'s protection against
contribution claims. When such a con-
flict exists, the majority view, which rec-
ognizes the conflict and then considers
the policies behind the statutes,150 is the
more sensible approach. Hence, in
cases in which non-selling PRPs attempt
to intervene in CERCLA actions, the plain
language approach is not the best.
B. Policy Considerations
When Congress enacted CERCLA in
1980, it had the dual policy concerns of
(1) promoting prompt investigation and
remediation of hazardous waste sites
and (2) shifting costs to PRPs.isi In
1986, Congress significantly changed
CERCLA by enacting SARA.' 52 The pro-
visions of SARA were intended to further
encourage the thorough and rapid
cleanup of waste sites.153
The majority of courts considering
CERCIA cases give great weight to the
policies underlying both CERCLA and
SARA.'s" These courts place great im-
portance on the incentive for quick settle-
ment under section 11 3(f)(2) of CERCLA
which provides settling PRPs with immu-
nity from contribution claims provided to
settling PRPs.i'
In United States v. Union Electric
Co., the court refused to consider the
policies underlying CERCIA.'" Instead,
the court read the plain language of the
statutes and concluded that intervention
by the non-settling PRPs was not
barred.157
The problem with this approach is
that when a court looks to statutory lan-
guage alone, it has no context in which
to interpret that language. When read
in a sterilized, fact free environment,
Sections 1 I3(i)"' and 11 3(f)(2)"s, of
CERCLA do not necessarily conflict.
Section 11 3(f)(2) simply provides protec-
tion from contribution claims to settling
PRPs, while Section 113(i) grants a right
of intervention to interested parties.
However, when one party seeks inter-
vention in order to protect potential con-
tribution claims, a conflict is created. It
becomes unclear whether the settling
PRPs' expectation of being free from con-
tribution claims or the non-settling PRPs'
interest in intervention should prevail. In
United States v. Union Electric Co., the
court denied that such an ambiguity was
created.W Therefore, the court refused
to consider the policy underlying the
statutes. 161
In the future, courts addressing cases
with facts similar to those in United
States v. Union Electric Co. should rec-
ognize that a statutory ambiguity is cre-
oted when intervention is sought in order
to protect contribution claims. In the
face of such ambiguity, the accepted
course of action is to use policy and leg-
islative intent to determine whether
no See supro note 140 for a list of cases using this approach.
51 See supro lexi accompanying note 39.
's See supro note 41 and accompanying text.
'" See supro note 41 and accompanying text.
1" See supro text accompanying note 142.
I" See supro note 17 and accompanying text.
'" United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1165-66.
' Id.at 1152
' See supro text accompanying note 50.
' See supro note 17 and accompanying text.
'" United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1152.
161 Id.
162 Chevron U.SA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 11984).
16 United States v. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 90.
'" See supro text accompanying note 29.
165 See supro text accompanying note 120.
166 See supra note 50 and accompanying texi.
167 United States v. Union Eec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1159.60.
'68 Boorrgaarden and Breer, supra note 34, at 90.
intervention is proper." Since one of
the primary policies behind CERCIA is
to promote prompt response to hazard-
ous waste problems,163 courts should
attempt to reach results that are consis-
tent with this goal. When non-settling
PRPs seek to intervene in CERCLA ac-
tions, the denial of intervention is the
only result that is consistent with CER-
CIA's underlying policy.
C. Results and Ramifications
In United States v. Union Electric
Co., the court found that Section
1 13(f)(1) of CERCLAi" gave the non-
settling PRPs a legally protectable interest
in contribution claims." Based on this
finding, the court held that under Section
11 3(i) of CERCA, 1" the non-settling
PRPs were among those to whom CER-
CIA granted a right of intervention.' 67
By reaching this conclusion and allow-
ing the non-settling PRPs to intervene in
this case, the court set a precedent that
will impact the settlement process in fu
ture Eighth Circuit CERCLA cases.
The most significant impact of this
decision will be its effect on EPA's ability
to reach settlements with PRPs in a quick
and effective manner. It is well ac-
cepted that CERCLA's success is de-
pendent on the voluntary settlement of
PRPs.is6 Congress, realizing this fact as
well, has provided incentives to encour-
age PRPs in CERCLA cases to enter set-
tlement agreements.' 69 One of the
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strongest of these incentives is provided
in Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA,izo
which grants settling PRPs protection
from contribution claims brought by non-
settling PRPs.7' Under Section
11 3(f)(2), PRPs who choose not to settle
are left with the possibility of being sub-
ject to a disproportionate share of liabil-
ity. It has been held that such a
technique "which promotes early settle-
ments and deters litigation for litigation's
sake, is an integral part of the statutory
plan."' 72
United States v. Union Electric Co.
effectively abrogates the primary incen-
tive of Congress' plan. The court found
that the goal of Section 113(f)(2),
encouraging prompt settlement, will
remain intact if intervention is allowed
under Section 11 3(i)."" This conclusion
improperly ignores the fact that allowing
non-settling PRPs to intervene will impede
prompt settlement in CERCLA cases. Al-
lowing non-settling PRPs to intervene to
protect contribution claims will eliminate
the incentive created by Section
113(f)(2). Settling PRPs will no longer
possess the security of knowing that they
are immune from contribution claims,
while non-settling PRPs will have the abil-
ity to wait until a proposed settlement is
under judicial review before asserting a
right to such claims. The main ramifica-
tion of case law such as United States v.
Union Electric Co. is the prelongation of
CERCLA settlement litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority view is that non-settling
PRPs do not have a right to intervene in
CERCLA actions in order to protect pos-
sible contribution claims against settling
PRPs. This view is supported by the poli-
cies and legislative intent underlying
CERCIA. By holding that non-settling
PRPs do have a right to intervene based
on their interest in protecting contribution
claims, United States v. Union Electric
Co. parts from the majority view and
sets a precedent which will hamper the
quick settlement of CERCIA actions in
the Eighth Circuit.
I.
See supro note 17 and accompanying text.
Boomgoorden and Breer, supro note 34, at 94.
United States v. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 92.
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